My research focuses on topics in ethics, legal and social philosophy, and the emotions. In particular, I have written on well-being, metaethical sentimentalism, welfarism, rights, the environment, punishment, restorative justice, and shame and guilt. My method is philosophical and empirically informed.
These days I am working with issues in philosophical methodology, and, more specifically, with the question of the relevance of psychology and neuroscience to ethics. I am tackling this question (1) systematically, by mapping out the modes in which science can and should affect ethical claims and theorising; and (2) punctually, by, for example, examining the way in which the psychology of moral judgement in normal and special -- e.g., autistic -- populations affects and should affect our moral theories. My long term project is to publish a philosophical, though empirically informed, monograph on Emotions, Law, and Morality.