Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen


Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen
Se relationer på Aarhus Universitet

Jeg modtog i 2007 min PhD fra Faculty of Philosophy, Cambridge University, hvor jeg studerede som Gates Cambridge Scholar og var medlem af Darwin College. Siden har jeg været ansat på Århus Universitet, hvor jeg nu er Lektor i filosofi. Jeg forsker primært indenfor erkendelsesteori og relaterede emner .

I 2009 modtog jeg Det Frie Forskningsråds Ung Eliteforsker Pris. Læs mere her. I 2011 blev jeg udpeget til DFF-forskningsleder under Sapere Aude programmet. Jeg er desuden redaktør for The Philosophical Lexicon, tidligere redigeret af Daniel Dennett.



Reasons for Belief  (redigeret med A. Reisner), Cambridge University Press (2011). 

Med bidrag fra Nishi Shah, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, Andrew Reisner, Veli Mitova, Jonas Olson, Clayton Littlejohn, Adam Leite, Hannah Ginsborg, Mark Schroeder, Ralph Wedgwood, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard.

Metaphysics: 5 Questions , New York: Automatic Press (2010).

Med bidrag fra Lynne Rudder Baker, Helen Beebee, Thomas Hofweber, Peter van Inwagen, Peter Menzies, Hugh Mellor, Stephen Mumford, Daniel Nolan, Eric Olson, L.A. Paul, Lorenz Puntel, Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gideon Rosen, Jonathan Schaffer, Peter Simons, Barry Smith, Michael Tooley, and Dean Zimmerman.

Udvalgte online publikationer

Weighing the aim of belief again, Logos & Episteme (forthcoming)

A higher-order approach to disagreement (w. M. Skipper Rasmussen and JC Bjerring), Episteme (forthcoming)

Epistemic instrumentalism, permissibility, and reasons for belief, in D. Whiting et al. (eds) Normativity: Practical and Epistemic Oxford University Press (forthcoming)

Fictional persuasion and the nature of belief, in E. Sullivan-Bissett et al. (eds) Art and the Nature of Belief Oxford University Press (forthcoming)

A reply to Céspedes' defense of causal contrastivism, Critica (2016)

Philosophical thought experiments as heuristics for theory discovery (w. S. Kier Praëm), Synthese (2015)

The epistemology of the precautionary principle: Two puzzles resolvedErkenntnis (2015)

Why desire reasoning is developmentally prior to belief reasoning (w. J. Michael), Mind & Language (2015)

Knowing the answer to a loaded questionTheoria (2015)

Truth as the aim of epistemic justification, in T. Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief, Oxford University Press (2013)

Transparency, Doxastic Norms, and the Aim of BeliefTeorema (2013). Special issue on the aim of belief, edited by José Zalabardo.

The No Guidance ArgumentTheoria (2013)

'Clumps and pumps: clumpiness, resolution and rational choice, Utilitas (2012).

'Against the contrastive account of singular causation'British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (2012).

'Against essential mental normativity again'Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review (2011). Special issue on normativity, edited by C. Tappolet and A. Voizard.

'How to be a teleologist about epistemic reasons', in A. Reisner and A. Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief, Cambridge University Press (2011)

'The truth norm and guidance: a reply to Glüer and Wikforss', Mind (2010)

'Causation' , in R. Poli and J. Seibt (eds.), Theory and Applications of Ontology: Philosophical Perspectives, Springer (2010)

'Luck as an epistemic notion', Synthese 176: 361-377 (2010)

'Anaphora and Semantic Innocence' (w. J.P. Smit), Journal of Semantics (2010) 

'Weighing the aim of belief', Philosophical Studies (2009)

'Does doxastic transparency support evidentialism?', Dialectica (2008)

'Against essential normativity of the mental', Philosophical Studies (2008)

'No norm needed: on the aim of belief', The Philosophical Quarterly (2006)

'Voluntarism and transparent deliberation', South African Journal of Philosophy (2006)

'Williamson on knowledge, action, and causation', Sats - Nordic Journal of Philosophy (2005)

'Davidson, truth, and semantic unity' , Sats - Nordic Journal of Philosophy (2003)

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